Please call to schedule your free initial consultation: 403.262.1110|melanie@yycdefence.ca

Appeal Lawyers Calgary

Sitar & Milczarek

Criminal Appeals & Complex Trials

The Defence Toolkit – May 17, 2025: Position of Trust

Posted On 17 May 2025

This week’s top three summaries: R v Selby, 2025 ABCJ 70: #trust position, R v Aleekuk, 2025 NWTCA 4: #kienapple, R v Ahola, 2025 ONSC 2614: #impaired by drug

R v Selby, 2025 ABCJ 70

[April 25, 2025] Sexual Exploitation (s.153): Position of Trust [Justice G.S. Dunnigan]

AUTHOR’S NOTE: This case provides a clear and comprehensive review of the legal contours of a “position of trust” under s. 153(1) of the Criminal Code—critical in cases of sexual exploitation involving 16- and 17-year-olds. Justice Dunnigan’s judgment stands out for its methodical approach to a factually borderline scenario, offering defence counsel a strong resource for framing similar cases.

🔹 Practical Use for Defence:

  • This case is a useful precedent where relationships begin after a formal authority role ends, particularly with near-age complainants.

  • Justice Dunnigan’s summary of case law on “trust” can be used to counter overly broad Crown arguments that seek to extend trust beyond its natural scope.

  • Counsel should consider using this case to push back on prosecutions rooted solely in past teacher-student dynamics when the facts show an evolved, autonomous relationship at the time of intimacy.


[1] The Accused was initially charged with both sexual exploitation and sexual assault contrary to ss 153 and 271 of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. Late in the trial proceedings, the Crown withdrew the sexual assault charge.

[3] In June 2018 the Complainant graduated from Western Canada High School (“Western”) in Calgary. The Accused was a teacher at this school. He was the Complainant’s homeroom teacher nd 11 and he taught the Complainant English in the fall semester of her grade 12 year from September 2017 to January 2018.

[4] In July of 2018, a sexual relationship between the Accused and the Complainant commenced, leading to the charges before the Court. The Accused was 35 years-old at the time of the first sexual activity with the Complainant on July 7, 2018; the Complainant was 17 on that date and turned 18 on August 13, 2018. Sexual activity continued between the Complainant and the Accused after the Complainant turned 18 for a period of approximately 2 years, ending in the spring of 2020.

ISSUE

[5] The relationship between former teachers and former students present distinct challenges for trial courts respecting both the teacher’s position of authority and their position of trust toward the student. By the time sexual activity commenced on July 7, 2018, the Accused was no longer the Complainant’s teacher as she had graduated. In July and August of 2018, all parties agree that any position of authority that the Accused may have had in relation to the Complainant terminated upon the Complainant’s completion of her exams and graduation in June of 2018.

[6] The sole issue for determination in this matter is whether a position of trust existed when the Accused and the Complainant engaged in sexual activity between the dates of July 7, 2018, and when the Complainant turned 18 on August 13, 2018. [Emphasis by PJM]

CONCLUSION

[7] For the reasons set forth below, I have reasonable doubt as to whether the Crown has proven the existence of a continuing position of trust between the Accused and the Complainant between July 7 th and August 12, 2018, and find the Accused not guilty of the charge before the Court.

CASE LAW AND THE POSITION OF TRUST

R v. Audet

[66] As acknowledged by the parties, the leading case on s 153(1) is the 1996 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Audet concerning a 22-year-old physical education teacher who had oral sex with a 14-year-old student he had taught while she was in eighth grade. The sexual activity took place during the summer months when the complainant was not in school. However, the accused knew at the time that he would be returning to the same school in the fall where the complainant would be completing ninth grade.

Justice La Forest, writing for the majority, identified the elements of the Offence that the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a conviction:

16 First, the offence applies to three separate categories of persons: those in a position of trust towards a young person, those in a position of authority towards a young person and those with whom the young person is in a relationship of dependency. The Code prohibits every person in such a position or relationship with respect to a young person from engaging in any of the sexual activities described in paras. (a) and (b) of s. 153(1). As well, contrary to the situation that exists with respect to a charge of sexual assault, a person charged under s. 153(1) cannot raise the young person’s consent as a defence (s. 150.1(1) of the Criminal Code). To obtain a conviction under s. 153(1), the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant is a young person within the meaning of s. 153(2), that the accused engaged in one of the activities referred to in s. 153(1) and, finally, that at the time the acts in question were committed the accused was in a position of trust or authority towards the young person or the young person was in a relationship of dependency with the accused. Of course, the Crown must also prove the mens rea required for each of these elements.

[69] The Justice went on to interpret of the meaning of “position of trust” in light of the Parliament’s motivation to protect young persons in positions of vulnerability as a result of their position in relation to adults occupying the special relationships in s 153(1):

36 I would add that the definition of the words used by Parliament, like the determination in each case of the nature of the relationship between the young person and the accused, must take into account the purpose and objective pursued by Parliament of protecting the interests of young persons who, due to the nature of their relationships with certain persons, are in a position of vulnerability and weakness in relation to those persons.

[original emphasis]

[70] …this type of privileged relationship is dependent on the factual circumstances of each particular case. To assist with this determination, trial judges should look to the age difference between a complainant and an accused, the evolution of their relationship and the status of the accused in relation to a complainant, though other factors may also be considered:

[71] Justice La Forest observed that teachers may not always be in positions of trust or authority in relation to their students, though they are in the majority of situations. Further, positions of trust and authority may come to an end. The Crown, however, need not lead evidence to show the important role teachers occupy in society, nor that this generally puts them in positions of both trust and authority vis-à-vis their students.

[72] Accordingly, though teachers are not de jure in a position of trust regarding their students, it is presumed that they are. This presumption, however, can be displaced:

43 In short, I am of the view that in the vast majority of cases teachers will indeed be in a position of trust and authority towards their students. It must also be recognized that there may be situations where, owing to exceptional factual circumstances, this is not the case because, even though the accused has the status of a teacher, his or her relationship with a particular student is such that the element of trust or authority is totally absent. I will refrain from speculating and suggesting hypothetical examples to illustrate this. However, in the absence of evidence raising a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact, it cannot be concluded that a teacher is not in a position of trust and authority towards his or her students without going against common sense. [Emphasis by PJM]

R v Aird

[84]….Justice Laskin reiterated the non-exhaustive factors set out in Audet, and supplemented them with two additional factors that may be considered:

28 The considerations that bear on whether a relationship comes within s. 153 flow from the obvious purpose of this section: to protect a young person who is vulnerable to an adult because of the imbalance in their relationship. With this purpose in mind, the courts have identified several considerations relevant to an assessment of whether a relationship of trust exists. They include:

• the age difference between the accused and the young person;

• the evolution of their relationship;

• the status of the accused in relation to the young person;

• the degree of control, influence or persuasiveness exercised by the accused over the young person; and

• the expectations of the parties affected, including the accused, the young person and the young person’s parents.

See R. v. Audet; R. v. C.D., [2000] O.J. No. 1667 (C.A.). See also R. v. D.E., [2009] O.J. No. 1909

29 No one consideration is determinative. But each one may play a role…[.]

R v EJB

[92] The factors for consideration set out in Aird were adopted by the Alberta Court of Appeal in EJB. The additional factors in RT were not mentioned. The Court of Appeal also noted that “[a] person who is regarded by the parent or guardian of the child, and/or by the child, to be a responsible person, relied upon to do the right thing vis à vis the child, is generally in a position of trust”.

[93] EJB concerned a 36-year-old accused who had sex with his 16-year-old niece. The complainant was living with the accused at the time, with the approval of the complainant’s father, stepmother, and grandparents. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in not finding the accused in a position of trust. It was only because of accused’s position of trust that the complainant’s parents and previous guardians allowed the complainant to live with the accused in the first place.

[99] As we observe from the above, courts have struggled since Audet to reach both a clear definition of a position of trust and a framework to apply to determine whether one is present. Ultimately, determination of whether an accused is in a position of trust is contextual and depends on analysis of all of the circumstances.

SUMMARY OF THE POSITION OF TRUST

[117] Defining a position of trust and determining whether one exists have proven difficult for courts for several decades. The jurisprudence has struggled to come up with a clear definition of what constitutes a position of trust. Whether an adult is in a position of trust towards a young person is a factual inquiry determined on a case-by-case basis and is dependent upon a consideration of the unique circumstances in each case.

[118] Positions of trust are said to occur where a young person is particularly vulnerable to an adult’s persuasive influence. Adults who occupy roles where they are expected, relied upon, or required, to do the right thing in relation to their interactions with young persons are generally considered to be in positions of trust.

[119] Teachers are presumed to be in positions of trust towards their students, but they are not in de jure positions of trust, and the presumption can be rebutted. Unlike some of the other privileged relationships set out in s 153, positions of trust attach to the person in question and may persist after a position of authority would terminate, or the factual circumstances that gave rise to the relationship have ended. As with other elements of a position of trust, how long this relationship may persist is dependent on the particular circumstances and no clear time delineation can be found in law.

SUMMARY OF FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT

Although defining and identifying a position of trust remains a nebulous, fact-specific endeavour, several key points and considerations may be gleaned from the case law:

Positions of trust are found where a young person is particularly vulnerable to the persuasive influence of an adult.

Determining whether an adult is in a position of trust towards a young person depends on the factual circumstances of each c

Though not exhaustive or determinative, courts should consider the following when making this determination:

o The age difference between the adult and young person;

o The evolution of the relationship between the adult and the young person;

o The status of the adult in relation to the young person;

o The degree of control, influence or persuasiveness exercised by the adult over the young person;

o The expectations of the parties affected which includes the parents of the young person; and

o Any grooming, pressuring or incentivising behaviour by the adult. .

Consideration of these factors is mandated to determine if there existed a power imbalance that left the young person in a vulnerable position.  The young person’s circumstances, maturity, sophistication, independence and agency may factor into this determination.

Age difference on its own is not enough to find an inherent power imbalance. A large age difference, however, weighs in favour of finding a relationship of trust.

Teachers are presumed to be in a position of trust towards their students, though this presumption can be overcome.

 The position of trust occupied by teachers can extend beyond the classroom and outside of work hours.

 An adult in a position of trust may be seen as having some duty to conduct themselves in a certain fashion towards a young person that would not be imposed on a regular person.

 Whether an adult occupies a position of trust may change over time. An adult who was at one point in a position of trust towards a young person may no longer occupy that position at the time sexual activity occurs.

 However, positions of trust may linger even after the circumstances originally giving rise to the relationship have ended.

 An adult may be viewed as being in a position of trust when the young person would trust the adult, view them as an authority figure, or where they were given access to the young person as a result of an existing relationship.

DETERMINATION OF THE POSITION OF TRUST ON THE FACTS

[133] It is clear the Accused stood in a position of trust towards the Complainant when he was her homeroom teacher in grades 10 and 11, as well as when he was taught her English in the first semester of grade 12. It might also be argued that the Accused would have continued to occupy a position of trust during the second semester of the Complainant’s grade 12 year, though he had no control or influence over the Complainant’s school marks or performance evaluations.

[134] However, it is evident from the testimony of the Complainant, as well as that of AB, that she was interested in developing a sexual relationship with the Accused as early as the examination period of her last year and thereafter. Once the Complainant was no longer a student at Western and he was no longer her teacher, the Accused presented as similarly interested in having sexual relations, which they engaged in on for the first time on July 7th, 2018. From this date forward the parties’ relationship continued to evolve in an adult fashion.

135] Until the Complainant’s graduation, the relationship between them had been that of teacher and student. It was neither intimate nor sexual.

[136] It was not until the Complainant had left the school that the relationship between the two changed to one of intimacy. Much like in Osmond, they “flipped the switch” in their relationship, which thereafter became intimate.

[137] While there is a significant age gap between the parties, which militates in favour of finding a position of trust, the Complainant in this case was not a young child or young teenager. She presented as mature, confident, sophisticated, and independent. She was beginning to live her life as an adult, capable of making her own decisions. These included plans for future education overseas and to pursue a career elsewhere in Canada, both of which she achieved.

[138] She made a conscious decision to seek and establish a relationship with the Accused. That relationship commenced from a clear decision of personal agency. It continued by their mutual agreement, lasting throughout her time overseas and while she worked in Montreal. The parties reconnected on the occasions when she returned to Calgary and ultimately maintained their relationship for a period just shy of 2 years.

[140] Importantly, the Complainant was not a child in the care of the Accused or one who had grown up in the same household or been entrusted by relatives to stand in the quasi-parental care of the Accused. This Court has no evidence regarding any expectations of relatives of the Complainant or of her relationship with the Accused being one of dependency. Rather the Complainant was beyond the age of consent and weeks short of her 18th birthday. This distinguishes this case from the decisions in Hajar, Friesen, EJB and Lemay.

[141] There was no evidence in this case of the Complainant feeling intimidated, pressured or persuaded by the Accused to engage in sexual relations at any time. Similarly, there was no evidence of the Accused grooming her during their school years at Western, which distinguishes this case from RT.

[142] Also, unlike the decisions in RT, Aird and Allard, the Complainant was not a very vulnerable or naïve person lacking in maturity or sophistication. There is no evidence the Complainant relied on the Accused for personal advice, or for love and care she lacked in her home or social life. Neither was there evidence that she suffered from emotional or psychological challenges.

[143] Lastly, unlike the decisions in Chung and Boere, there was no continuing relationship of authority during the time sexual relations began and continued.

[144] While the Accused did stress the need for secrecy in their relationship and, on at least one occasion, reprimanded her for not taking this seriously enough, this conversation occurred after the Accused was 18, and did not involve threats against the Complainant. Moreover, the evidence reflected that the Accused did not maintain power, persuasion or control over the Complainant as she chose to disclose their relationship as she saw fit, leading to testy exchanges between the parties.

[145] The following hallmarks of concern expressed by the courts that do not present in this case include the following:

childhood bond with the Accused developed from a young age;

 parental entrustment and expectations of quasi-parental responsibilities of the Accused;

 dependency of the Complainant on the Accused for emotional support or personal life advice;

 grooming, pressure, threats, incentivisation or persuasion on the Accused’s part;

 a power imbalance, beyond their age difference, between the parties;

 evidence of prior intimacy or sexual activity during their pre-existing relationship as student and teacher;

 authority, control over or exploitation of the Complainant by the Accused;

 a particular naïveté, vulnerability, weakness or young age on the part of the Complainant.

46] The significant age gap between the parties and the existence of a prior teacher/student relationship might make the Accused’s decision to begin an intimate relationship so quickly after graduation appear on its face to be unseemly, distasteful, ill-advised or perhaps even immoral.

[147] However, neither Parliament nor the courts have sought to prohibit a teacher absolutely from having a relationship with a former student or to define a socially acceptable “cooling-off” period.

[148] In conclusion, I am left in doubt whether there existed a position of trust at the time of the sexual activity in question.

R v Aleekuk, 2025 NWTCA 4

[May 7, 2025] Sentencing: Kienapple (Included Offences) [Jack Watson J.A., Jolaine Antonio J.A, Karen Wenckeback J.A.] 

AUTHOR’S NOTE: This case is a concise and practical reaffirmation of the Kienapple principle, which prevents multiple convictions for the same delictual act. It reinforces that only the most serious offence arising from a single transaction should proceed to conviction and sentencing, while lesser or overlapping offences must be judicially stayed.


🔹 Key Takeaways:

  • Kienapple v. The Queen, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729:
    Established that where the same conduct underlies multiple offences, and there is sufficient factual and legal overlap, only one conviction should stand.

  • Lesser-Included Offences Must Be Stayed:
    Even if the greater offence has additional elements, courts are obligated to stay the lesser charge when the same factual nucleus gives rise to both.

  • Overlap ≠ Identity, but Close Enough:
    The test is not perfect identity but whether the material facts necessary to prove one offence are the same as those needed to prove the other.

  • Timing of the Stay:
    The proper time to stay the lesser offence is prior to sentencing, ensuring the offender is not punished twice for the same conduct.


I. Introduction

[1] The appellant William Robert Aleekuk was convicted of attempted murder, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and aggravated assault in relation to the shooting of Jeremy Tyler on October 10, 2021. The trial judge conditionally stayed the discharging a firearm conviction pursuant to R v Kienapple, [1975] 1 SCR 729, 1974 CanLII 14 [Kienapple].

[2]….. In the event his conviction for attempted murder is upheld, the appellant submits his aggravated assault conviction should also be stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

[3] For the reasons that follow, the conviction appeal is dismissed, and the aggravated assault conviction is conditionally stayed.

IV. Analysis

C. Application of Kienapple

[33] The Kienapple case, subsequently considered in R v Prince, [1986] 2 SCR 480, 1986 CanLII 40 [Prince], gave effect to the longstanding principle that “multiple convictions are not without good reason heaped on an accused in respect of a single criminal delict”: Prince at para 14. Where there is a sufficient factual and legal nexus between two delicts, a conditional stay will be entered in respect of the less serious offence: R v Wolfe, 2024 SCC 34 at paras 71-72 [Wolfe].

[34] Here, the respondent Crown concedes the requisite factual nexus but submits the offences are legally distinct because (i) as the trial judge held, “one would not necessarily commit an aggravated assault through attempting murder in the manner particularized” in the charging document, which was “by discharging a firearm at [the] victim”, and (ii) attempted murder is a specific intent offence while aggravated assault is a general intent offence. The respondent has cited no authority holding that these factors will bar the application of Kienapple.

[35] In the overwhelming majority of cases where guilt has been found on both attempted murder and aggravated assault, Kienapple has been found to apply and the aggravated assault charge has been stayed. The respondent has not explained how the legal nexus differs in this case from the vast majority of precedents. A legal nexus exists where “there is no additional and distinguishing element that goes to guilt contained in the offence for which a conviction is sought to be precluded by the Kienapple principle” [emphasis added]: Wolfe at para 71; Prince at para 32. s overlap between the elements of two offences, the driving factor in the Kienapple analysis is Parliamentary intent: Prince at paras 31, 34-39. In short, legal nexus is to be found between the offences, not the wording of the charging document: see, e.g., R v Clark, 2008 ABCA 271 at para 35. The trial judge erred by relying on the manner in which the attempted murder charge was “particularized” in the Information to find an additional and distinguishing element. [Emphasis by PJM]

[36] On appeal, the Crown submits the two offences can be distinguished for Kienapple purposes because attempted murder requires specific intent while aggravated assault requires only general intent. This argument reverses the Kienapple analysis. “Kienapple may bar a conviction for a lesser offence, notwithstanding that there are additional elements in the greater offence … provided that there are no distinct additional elements in the lesser offence”: Prince at para 33. Specific intent is a higher degree of mens rea than general intent and can, for present purposes, be thought of as an additional element associated with the attempted murder offence. For this very reason, murder can be reduced to the lesser offence of manslaughter: R v Robinson, [1996] 1 SCR 683, 1996 CanLII 233.

[37] The trial judge erred in failing to conditionally stay the aggravated assault charge after convicting the appellant of attempted murder. We allow the appeal to this extent.

V. Conclusion

[38] For the foregoing reasons, the conviction appeal is dismissed, and the aggravated assault conviction is conditionally stayed.

R v Ahola, 2025 ONSC 2614

[April 29, 2025] Impaired by Drug: Mens Rea (Mental Element) [Justice S.K. Stothart]

AUTHOR’S NOTE: This case is a strong reminder of the importance of conducting a full W(D) analysis—especially when dealing with the mens rea for drug-impaired driving involving prescribed medication.


🔹 Key Principles Clarified:

  1. Voluntariness and Prescription Drugs:

    • There is a rebuttable presumption that impairment from a drug is voluntarily induced.

    • If the drug is prescribed, and the accused claims unawareness of its impairing effects, then mens rea may be absent.

  2. Effect Unknown = No Mens Rea:

    • Even if the accused is factually impaired, no offence is committed without knowledge or reasonable foreseeability of impairment.

    • This speaks directly to the subjective mens rea requirement of the offence.

  3. W(D) Applies Even After Disbelief:

    • A trial judge cannot stop at disbelieving the accused.

    • They must go further and ask whether the accused’s testimony, even if not fully accepted, raises a reasonable doubt about mens rea.

    • Failure to do so is a legal error.


S.K. STOTHART J.

[1] On June 30, 2023, Justice A.H. Perron found the appellant Ann Marie Ahola guilty of operating a conveyance while her ability to do so was impaired to any degree by alcohol or a drug contrary to s. 320.14(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c.C-46,

[3] For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that the trial judge’s reasons did not adequately address the second stage of the R. v. W.(D). analysis with respect to whether the appellant’s evidence, although rejected, nevertheless left the court with reasonable doubt on an essential element of the offence. As such, I allow the appeal and order a new trial.

Analysis

[41] I will deal with the first two grounds of appeal. I find that these grounds have not been made out in this case.

Was the verdict unreasonable

[42] The evidence at trial was that the appellant operated a conveyance in an erratic and dangerous manner. When she was stopped by the police, she had difficulty staying awake, comprehending what was going on, operating the windows and doors of the vehicle, and walking. Her symptoms became more pronounced when she was brought to the police station. When her blood was tested it revealed the presence of two central nervous system depressants, both of which, alone or in combination, can impair one’s ability to operate a motor vehicle. Many of the symptoms observed by the police in this case are associated with central nervous and depressant drugs.

[43] The appellant submits that the verdict was unreasonable because the drugs found in her blood were prescribed and the levels detected were within a therapeutic range. The fact that a drug is prescribed by a doctor at a certain therapeutic dose does not necessarily mean the prescribed drug will not impair one’s ability to operate a conveyance. It is commonplace to see labels on prescription bottles warning of the impairing effects of prescribed medication, such as “may cause drowsiness” and advising against operating machinery or driving. In this case, the toxicologist testified that the levels of central nervous system depressant drugs found in the appellant’s blood had the potential to impair her ability to operate a conveyance. This, coupled with the appellant’s poor driving and physical symptoms, provided an ample basis upon which a trier of fact, properly instructed, could reasonably conclude that the appellant’s ability to operate a conveyance was impaired by drug.

[44] As such, this ground of appeal must fail.

Did the trial judge err in his application of W.(D.)

[53] The appellant submits that the trial judge committed an error in law in applying the steps as set out in R. v. W.(D.). Specifically, that the trial judge erred by not proceeding to the second step of the analysis which requires the court to consider whether, having rejected the evidence of the appellant, the appellant’s evidence nevertheless left him in reasonable doubt.

[54] The appellant testified that she was suffering from some type of gastro-intestinal virus and that this explained the bad driving and the other physical symptoms observed the police. She conceded in cross-examination that it was possible that she was impaired by a combination of the drugs in her system and her illness. The appellant submitted at trial that some of her observed symptoms, which included vomiting and sweating, supported her evidence that she had a viral infection. She relied on the hospital discharge report filed at trial as supporting her evidence because it indicated a suspicion by the medical professionals that she may have had a viral infection.

[55] While the appellant acknowledged that methadone and clonazepam were found in her blood, she testified that she had been taking these drugs for years and they did not have an impairing effect on her. The appellant submits that the evidence of the toxicologist was capable of supporting her evidence on this point, that her long-term use of these drugs had mitigated their impairing effect on her. [Emphasis by PJM]

[56] In his reasons for decision, the trial judge found that the appellant’s evidence was not credible or reliable. Immediately after finding her evidence not credible, the trial judge went on to find:

Based on that and reviewing the totality of the evidence I am therefore satisfied that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the cause of impairment was the drugs. We must remember Stellato, it’s not the level of impairment, it’s any level of impairment, and I agree that the gastro infection probably made things a lot worse, but the root cause was still the drugs….

[57] The trial judge did not refer specifically to the steps as set out in R. v. W.(D.) in his reasons for decision. He was not required to do so. However, he was required to set out in his reasons his appreciation that, despite finding the appellant to be unreliable or not credible, he still was required to consider whether her evidence nevertheless left him with a reasonable doubt.

[58] The trial judge’s finding “Based on that and reviewing the totality of the evidence I am therefore satisfied that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the cause of impairment was the drugs.” leaves it unclear whether the trial judge moved from a rejection of the appellant’s evidence (the first step of W.(D.)) directly to the third step which requires a court to consider “even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused”. [Emphasis by PJM]

[59] The trial judge found that he was satisfied that the Crown had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the cause of impairment included the drugs taken by the appellant. This related to the actus reus of the offence.

[60] The actus reus of the offence involves operating or having the care or control of a conveyance while one’s ability to do so is impaired as a result of the ingestion of a drug. Any degree of impairment, ranging from slight to great is sufficient to constitute the actus reus. Further, the drug does not have to be the sole contributing factor in causing the person’s ability to be impaired. It is sufficient if the drug is a contributing factor: R. v. Toews, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 119 (S.C.C.); R. v. Stellato (1994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 160 (S.C.C.); R. v. Bartello, [1997] O.J. No. 2226 (Ont.C.A.) at para. 2; R. v. Caldwell, [2006] O.J. No. 3290 (Ont.S.C.J.) at paras. 10 to 13.

[62] The Crown was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant possessed the requisite actus reus and mens rea. The mens rea for the offence of impaired operation of a conveyance by drug involves the voluntary consumption of a drug. Where it has been established that an accused was operating a conveyance while their ability to do so was impaired by a drug, a rebuttable presumption arises that their condition was voluntarily induced: R. v. King, [1962] S.C.R. 746 (S.C.C.) at para. 63. [Emphasis by PJM]

[64]…the presumption that impairment by drug was voluntarily induced may be rebutted. This generally arises in cases where it is alleged that the accused was impaired by a drug that was prescribed to them by a doctor and in circumstances where the accused did not know (or was not reckless) about its potential impairing effects. In King, the Supreme Court noted at para. 69: “If it appears that the impairment was produced as a result of using a drug in the form of  medicine or doctor’s order, and its effect was unknown to the accused, then the presumption is rebutted”.

[65] Even if a person consumes a prescribed drug, without being aware of (or reckless as to) its impairing effect, they may still be found to possess the requisite mens rea where they become aware of their impairment and proceed to operate a conveyance in the fact of this knowledge. In King, at para. 68, the Supreme Court held that a person cannot escape liability having made a choice to proceed in the face of knowledge of their impairment: R. v. King, at para. 68.

[66] In the particular circumstances of this case, mens rea was a live issue that needed to be resolved. The appellant testified that she had been prescribed methadone and had been taking clonazepam for years. She testified that she did not experience impairing effects when she took these drugs. At trial, she relied on the evidence of the toxicologist that long-term use of these drugs could result in it being “less likely” that there would be problems with respect to operating a conveyance. [Emphasis by PJM]

[67] The trial judge clearly rejected the appellant’s evidence that she was only impaired by her illness. In the end, he found he was satisfied that she was likely impaired by both the drugs in her system and her illness. However, this aspect of his decision dealt only with whether the actus reus had been established.

[68] I cannot tell from the reasons for decision if the trial judge considered whether the appellant’s evidence, even if rejected, nevertheless left him with a reasonable doubt with respect to the mens rea. That is, having been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs she consumed contributed to her impairment (actus reus), was the trial judge satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that either (a) the appellant was aware of, or reckless as to, whether those drugs could cause impairment when she consumed them; or (b) even if she was not aware of their impairing effect, did she become aware that they had caused her to be impaired and chose to operate a conveyance despite this. While both of these conclusions were reasonably available to the trial judge on the evidence before him, a literal and functional review of the trial judge’s reasons do not indicate whether they were resolved on the second stage of W.(D.). which required him to consider whether the appellant’s evidence, even if rejected, left him with a reasonable doubt with respect to the mens rea.

[69] Given that the trial judge’s reasons leave it unclear whether he conducted this analysis as it related to the issue of mens rea, the appeal must be allowed.

Conclusion

[70] For these reasons, the appeal is allowed, and a new trial is ordered.

 

Also on the Blog

The Defence Toolkit – May 10, 2025: Unsavoury Mr Big Identification

This week's top three summaries: R v KF, 2025 ABCA 149: #principled exception ID, R v JC, 2025 ONCA 331: DO #intractability, R v Willier, 2025 ABKB...

The Defence Toolkit – May 3, 2025: Panicked Provocation

This week's top three summaries: R v Picken, 2025 SKCA 43: #provocation, R v Lako, 2025 ONCA 284: #principled exception, R v Davis, 2025 ONSC 2404:...

The Defence Toolkit – April 19, 2025: s.10(b) – Just Dial the Number

This week's top three summaries: R v Tierney, 2025 ABKB 223: 10(b) SW #delay & overhold, R v Cardinal, 2025 ABCA 128: #principled exception, R v...

About Us

Working through your complex trial materials

Our lawyers have been litigating criminal trials and appeals for over 16 years in courtrooms throughout Canada. We can be of assistance to your practice. Whether you are looking for an appeal referral or some help with a complex written argument, our firm may be able to help. Our firm provides the following services available to other lawyers for referrals or contract work:

  1. Criminal Appeals
  2. Complex Criminal Litigation
  3. Ghostwriting Criminal Legal Briefs

Please review the rest of the website to see if our services are right for you.

Pawel Milczarek, Appellate Lawyer in Calgary, AB.

Written By Pawel Milczarek

Pawel is a partner at Sitar & Milczarek. When he’s not litigating he writes the Defence Toolkit blog.

Related Posts

The Defence Toolkit – September 20, 2024: Crying Out

The Defence Toolkit – September 20, 2024: Crying Out

This week's top three summaries: R v Viau, 2024 ABCA 291: s271 #crying out, R v Stettner, 2024 SKCA 88: extrinsic #misconduct, and R v Brazil, 2024 ABKB 390: 11(b) #stay under 30. R v Viau, 2024 ABCA 291 [September 6, 2024] Sexual Assault: Myths and Crying Out for...

The Defence Toolkit – April 20, 2024: Blackout

The Defence Toolkit – April 20, 2024: Blackout

This week's top three summaries: R v Green, 2024 ABCA 118: #blackout and sex, R v TH, 2024 BCCA 123: CSO and appeal standard, and R v ADM, 2024 ABKB 212: #credibility and extrinsic facts. Our firm focuses on representation in complex criminal trials and criminal...