This week’s top three summaries: R v Lovell, 2026 BCCA 361: #child witnesses, R v DV, 2026 ONCA 611: #omissions, R v Simms, 2026 BCCA 363: air of #reality

R v Lovell, 2026 BCCA 361

[September 1, 2026] Child Witnesses: Material Inconsistencies, Inaccuracies, Exaggerations and Embellishment are Significant Despite Youth of Witness [Reasons by Winteringham J.A. with Edelmann and Francis JJ.A. concurring]

AUTHOR’S NOTE: The youthful age of a witness, particularly a complainant in a sexual assault or assault case, does not excuse the court from objectively assessing the witness’s evidence. While the law requires inconsistencies to be considered in an age-sensitive manner, material inconsistencies, inaccuracies, exaggerations and embellishments must still be assessed on the individual facts of the case. A general assumption that youth explains or excuses unreliable evidence cannot substitute for a proper credibility and reliability analysis. An age-based explanation that fails to account for material inconsistencies may constitute a palpable and overriding error.

Overview

[2] The events underlying the charge occurred in 2021 when the complainant was 11 and 12 years old. The complainant’s father and the appellant worked together at a home maintenance company. The appellant met the complainant as an infant when her father, a single parent, would occasionally bring her to work. In 2021, the complainant’s father asked the appellant to assist with afterschool care by picking the complainant up from school on the occasional day she had early dismissal and her usual babysitter could not make the pickup time. On these occasions, the appellant would transport the complainant to her babysitter’s house or would bring the complainant back to the office to await her father’s return from the jobsite. Although the exact number of pickups was unclear on the evidence, it appears the appellant picked up the complainant less than 20 times from school. The complainant alleges the appellant sexually touched her during these drives and at the workplace. The appellant testified and denied all allegations of sexual touching. He said he agreed to help the complainant’s father and would play with the complainant during the times he looked after her. In his testimony, he detailed the different games they played and how they interacted both in his car and at the workplace. He maintained that none of these interactions were sexual.

On Appeal

[32] The appellant raises three grounds of appeal. First, the judge erred in his credibility assessment by: (1) subjecting the complainant’s account to a lower level of scrutiny because she was a child, rather than testing her evidence against the criminal standard of proof;….

Analysis

Standard of review

[36] The verdict in this case turned on the trial judge’s assessment of the credibility and reliability of the testimony of the witnesses. As noted in Kruk, the “governing standard of review applicable to findings of credibility and reliability is well established: absent a recognized error of law, such findings are entitled to deference unless a palpable and overriding error can be shown”: at para 82, citations omitted. This deferential standard, however, does not displace the need for meaningful appellate review. On this point, Justice Martin stated, “even under this more deferential standard, appellate courts must determine whether the trial judge’s findings on credibility and reliability are ‘the product of an evidence-based and context-specific assessment’ of the witness’s testimony”: at para. 85, citing R. v. Pastro, 2021 BCCA 149 at para. 67.

Assessment of child testimony

[41] In the present case, the trial judge recognized that children may experience the world differently than adults. Details like the time, place, and frequency of events may be missing from their recollections because such details may be less important to children. That is not to say that children’s testimony is subjected to a lesser or different standard of proof. Judges should approach children’s evidence in a common sense way, considering its strengths and weaknesses in each particular case. Inconsistencies, particularly as to peripheral matters such as time and location, should be considered in the context of the age of the witness at the time of the events to which the witness is testifying: W. (R.); M.D. at para. 56; R. v. Hernandez-Lopez, 2020 BCCA 12 at paras. 8, 20. In W. (R.) at 134, Justice McLachlin wrote:

As Wilson J. emphasized in B. (G.), these changes in the way the courts look at the evidence of children do not mean that the evidence of children should not be subject to the same standard of proof as the evidence of adult witnesses in criminal cases. Protecting the liberty of the accused and guarding against the injustice of the conviction of an innocent person require a solid foundation for a verdict of guilt, whether the complainant be an adult or a child. What the changes do mean is that we approach the evidence of children not from the perspective of rigid stereotypes, but on what Wilson J. called a “common sense” basis, taking into account the strengths and weaknesses which characterize the evidence offered in the particular case.

As Justice McLachlin makes clear, changes in the approach to the testimony of child witnesses does not alter the standard of proof in criminal cases. The testimony of children must still be measured against proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As she states, every person giving testimony in court, of whatever age, is an individual, whose credibility and evidence must be assessed by reference to criteria appropriate to their mental development, understanding, and ability to communicate: at 134.

[42] In R. v. Horton, 1999 BCCA 150, Justice Esson cautioned against an approach to children’s testimony that caused an inadvertent shift of the burden of proof. He stated:

[21] Further, when it comes to assessing the credibility of children, the trier of fact should first assess the intelligence, maturity, experience and cultural background of the child, and then decide whether any of the alleged inconsistencies or inaccuracies in the evidence are of significance given the witness’s background that is before the court. The mere fact that the witness is a child does not mean that inconsistencies or inaccuracies lose their significance. All of this, of course, must be weighed in the light of the evidence of the accused and his or her witnesses.

In other words, inconsistencies or inaccuracies in a child’s testimony do not lose their significance solely because the witness is a child.

 

The judge was palpably wrong in finding that credibility and reliability concerns from exaggeration, embellishment, and inconsistency in the complainant’s evidence were minor and explained by her age

 

[43] In his reasons, the judge acknowledged several weaknesses in the complainant’s evidence: her perception of the touching appeared influenced by external sources (at para. 117); her evidence, at times, did not make sense (at para. 121); concerns arose with exaggeration (at para. 123); concerns arose with reliability (at para. 125); and there were other inconsistencies, leaving some areas of evidence “quite muddled” (at paras. 128–129). The judge then rationalized each away in turn. This left the judge convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the events underlying the charges occurred entirely as the complainant described them: at para. 132.

[44] The judge correctly stated the legal principles governing credibility assessments and child witnesses. However, with respect, I am of the view that he failed to apply these principles in accordance with the instruction that the standard of proof is not altered—the testimony of children must still be measured against the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. While the judge correctly instructed himself that the complainant’s evidence “must be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as the accused’s evidence to determine if it has the strength to establish the offences beyond reasonable doubt” (at para. 112), he was palpably wrong in finding that, in light of her age and the general proposition that children perceive the world differently than adults, the frailties in her evidence did not render aspects of her evidence unreliable. As I will explain, the problems with the complainant’s testimony were not so easily dismissed. Doing so had the effect of lowering the standard of proof.[Emphasis by PJM]

[45] Two deficiencies in particular—exaggeration and reliability concerns—went to material aspects of the complainant’s evidence. The judge found that these concerns were of limited significance when considered in light of the complainant’s age:

[123] There were instances where concerns arise about exaggeration. For example, H. acknowledges her exaggeration in suggesting that the accused paddled her buttocks a million times. She walked back from that assertion when she began her testimony at trial. She suggested what she meant was that it happened too many times to keep track of or count. While walking back that instance, the fact of such exaggeration potentially casts some shadow on her other evidence or estimates that she might have provided.

[124] Taking into account her age, maturity, explanation, and it being an exaggeration of the amount of the event, rather than whether the event happened, limited significance should be attached to the fact of exaggeration in reviewing her evidence as a whole.

[125] Similarly, reliability concerns arise from H’s evidence regarding how long she had been picked up by the accused at school. She maintained the view in her video evidence and at trial that she was getting picked up by the accused from school since she was nine years of age. The basis for her belief was not established, but it was clear on the evidence from other witnesses that the accused did not begin transporting H. until May 2021 when H. was 11 and a half years of age, just about eight months prior to the police interview.

[126] This is not really a peripheral matter, as H.’s evidence was that the inappropriate conduct by the accused regarding hitting her buttocks began on the first day that she was picked up by the accused. A young person will understandably have a different conception of time and its elapse compared to an adult and it would be inappropriate to judge their error in time in the same way we might an adult.

[127] In this regard, I note that on cross-examination, she ultimately came to agree that she could have been age 11 at the time of the start of these events. She was indeed age 11 when she started being picked up by the accused.

[Emphasis added.][Emphasis by PJM]

[46] Considering the totality of the evidence presented, these deficiencies (as identified by the judge) required scrutiny. With respect, attributing the deficiencies to age tended to excuse the problems in circumstances where more was required. The judge discussed only one instance but exaggeration was evident in three areas of the complainant’s testimony: (1) the frequency of the sexual touching and length of time it had been ongoing; (2) the content of the text exchanges; and (3) the circumstances surrounding sitting on the appellant’s lap. I will discuss each in turn.

(1) The frequency of the alleged sexual touching and length of time it had been ongoing

[47] Both the frequency and duration of the alleged sexual touching proved to be substantially less than the complainant first reported to the police. She initially told police that the appellant touched her buttocks with the ping pong paddle “probably like a million times” but then clarified her estimate to 30–50 times each time he picked her up from school. She thought he had picked her up about 30–50 times but was not sure since he did not pick her up often….

….When defence counsel suggested that the appellant only hit her on the buttocks several times, while she hit him at least 12 times a ping pong session, the complainant said, “I don’t know exactly how many times we hit each other, but we did, though”.

[49] It was clear on the evidence from the adult witnesses that the offending could only have occurred during two windows of time: from late May to June 2021 (when she was 11 years old) and September to December 2021 (when she was 11 and 12 years old). The uncontradicted evidence was that the appellant drove the complainant 13–18 times. Three years of offending compared to four to five months of offending, as confirmed by the undisputed evidentiary record on this point, and as acknowledged by the judge, was more than a peripheral matter. It was a substantial inconsistency on an issue material to the charge.

[51] The exaggeration that was more problematic, and in my view cannot be fully explained with reference to her age, is the complainant’s substantial inflation of the duration of time the after-school pickups and associated sexual touching had been ongoing. I acknowledge “frequency” of the alleged conduct is a detail that “may be missing from [a child’s] recollections because such details may be less important to [the child]”: R. v. M.D., 2021 BCCA 339 at para. 56. However, the assessment does not end there. W. (R.) instructs “the presence of inconsistencies . . . should be considered in the context of the age of the witness at the time of the events to which [the witness] is testifying”: at 134.

[52] The judge did not articulate how he considered the complainant’s exaggeration of the duration of the conduct in light of her age. I would note that the complainant was 12 years old during her police interview. This interview occurred about a month after the last alleged incident of sexual touching and within a year of when the conduct allegedly began. This distinguishes the present case from cases like W. (R.), which involved a 9-year-old complainant testifying about events that occurred when she was between two and four years old. Something more than a general reference to the complainant’s age was required to explain why her exaggeration on this point did not raise reliability concerns, or if it did, how those concerns were resolved.

(2) Evidence of request for nighttime selfie

[54] ….Towards the end of her police interview, she was asked about text messages. When the police officer asked what she and the appellant texted about, the complainant responded, at first, with “Well just normal, hey, how are you”. Then she quickly added: “Oh yeah and he also wanted a selfie of me at night, at night with my pajamas”.

[55] All of the text exchanges between the complainant and the appellant were entered as an exhibit at trial. The date and time stamp of the selfie text exchange indicate that the request was made around noon on December 24. At trial, the complainant confirmed that this time and date stamp was accurate. The text reads as follows:

Maybe take a nice selfie later and send it to me to see your Christmas clothes and smile …

[56] During her direct examination, the complainant testified about the selfie text as follows:

A Well, I just feel it wouldn’t be appropriate for a 12-year-old to send a grown man a selfie in her pajamas. That’s [indiscernible] close circle of people that she knows.

[57] ….The cross-examination proceeded as follows:

Q But that’s not what the text message says, is it? There’s no reference to pajamas. It says:

See your Christmas clothes and smile.

A Well, I take Christmas clothes as pajamas, because that’s just what I was like taught growing up, that Christmas clothes are like pajamas.

Q Well, it’s not Christmas morning, you agree with that? It’s Christmas Eve —

A Eve.

Q — morning, right?

A Yeah.

[58] The judge resolved this aspect of the evidence as follows:

[130] There was some issue taken by defence counsel with respect to an inconsistency of H.’s evidence about the text request that the accused made for her to take a selfie in her Christmas clothes. H. had told the police in her video statement that the selfie request was for a picture in her pyjamas, which certainly presented as particularly intrusive. However, the text message from the accused around midday on Christmas Eve said that he was asking for a selfie “to see your Christmas clothes and smile”. When pointed out to H., she agreed with this, but she said that she thought Christmas clothes were referring to pyjamas. This did not strike me as a particularly significant lapse.

[Emphasis added.]

[59] ….  At trial, the complainant agreed that the selfie request was sent mid-day and made no mention of pajamas…..

[60] As with the previous instance of exaggeration, this exaggeration was to evidence material to the charge. Both Crown and defence counsel made submissions about the inference to be drawn from this particular text message. In finding the Crown had proven “sexual purpose” beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge relied, in part, on the “intimacy of the language used in texts from the [appellant]”: at para. 136. The evidence was controversial at trial, the text was given a nefarious meaning and was ultimately used against the appellant to convict him. A trial judge need not address each piece of evidence presented. However, this text featured in the trial and was ultimately used as evidence, in circumstances where there was little else, to prove sexual purpose. It was incumbent on the judge to consider the impact of this material inconsistency on the complainant’s credibility and reliability. The credibility and reliability concerns raised by this exaggeration did not lose their significance on account of the complainant’s age.

(3) Evidence about request to sit on appellant’s lap

[61] The third and final example of exaggeration in the complainant’s evidence was her inconsistent evidence about whether and when she may have sat on the appellant’s lap. To the police, the complainant reported that the appellant would ask her to sit on his lap, which she did not like. During her direct evidence at trial, the complainant said that the appellant would ask her to sit on his lap while he sat on one of the chairs in the ping pong room at the office. She said this made her uncomfortable. She did not recall the appellant ever asking her to sit on his lap in other places in the office. This was inconsistent with her father’s evidence. He recalled returning to the office and observing, on a few occasions, the complainant sitting on the appellant’s lap in his office, playing a card game on the appellant’s computer.

[62] Further, during cross-examination, the complainant described this conduct somewhat differently:

Q And when you’d get on [the appellant’s] — you said his lap — you would actually get on one of [the appellant’s] two knees and sit on it; is that true?

A Yes.

Q And sometimes you’d just do it yourself because you wanted to get on his knee and look at your —

A Sometimes.

Q Pardon me?

A Sometimes.

[63] The judge agreed that this part of the evidence was “quite muddled”:

[64] The evidence, with respect, was more than just “muddled”. It was inconsistent with the conduct the complainant had earlier described and arguably, was consistent with the appellant’s description of what occurred. That is, the conduct was not sexual and was but an example of a child moving to sit on an adult’s knee, on her own accord, to play games on a computer, often in the presence of others.

Disposition

[69] I would allow the appeal from conviction on the first ground raised by the appellant, quash the conviction, and would order a new trial.

R v DV, 2026 ONCA 611

[August 31, 2026] Youthful Witness Credibility: Omissions [Reasons by M. Rahman J.A. with B.W. Miller and Gary Trotter JJ.A. concurring]

AUTHOR’S NOTE: In child abuse cases, allegations may surface for the first time at trial. The youthful age of a witness does not provide a basis for disregarding or minimizing the significance of such a new allegation. The omission of the allegation from earlier police complaints or statements must be assessed in light of the circumstances in which those statements were obtained. This case demonstrates the appropriate approach. Defence counsel should closely examine the police interview for indications that the witness was encouraged to provide a complete account, assured that they could speak freely and without fear, given sufficient time to recount what occurred, and expressly told that they could contact police if anything further came to mind. These are ordinary features of a proper police interview of a youthful witness. Where such assurances and opportunities were provided, the emergence of a material allegation for the first time at trial may provide a significant basis for challenging the witness’s credibility and reliability. As this case demonstrates, it is the obligation of defence counsel to do so when confronted with such an occurrence. 

[1] After a short jury trial, the appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his former spouse, L.V., during their relationship, and of assaulting the couple’s two oldest children. The appellant advances only one ground of appeal: that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.

[2] The appellant’s trial was brief. L.V. and the appellant were the only witnesses who testified. The case turned on credibility. L.V. alleged that the appellant would repeatedly sexually assault her during a period of their marriage when they lived in Ontario, sometimes three to five times per day. L.V. said that the assaults involved the appellant forcing her to have sexual intercourse with him. L.V. also testified that the appellant would assault their two oldest children, J.V. and R.V. He would shake both children and also hit J.V., leaving him bruised.

[3] The appellant denied that he had ever assaulted L.V. or their children. He denied ever committing any sexual assaults against L.V. The appellant also testified that it was L.V. who would physically discipline their children, and that he would try to persuade her to stop.

III. ANALYSIS

The Test for IAC Claims

[13] The well-established test that this court applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC claims”) requires an appellant to establish the following on a balance of probabilities (R. v. Fiorilli, 2021 ONCA 461, 156 O.R. 582, at para. 48):

(1) The facts on which the claim is grounded (the factual component);

(2) The incompetence of representation provided by trial counsel (the performance component); and

(3) A miscarriage of justice as a result of the incompetent representation (the prejudice component).

[14] After an appellant establishes the material facts of the IAC claim, the court will move to the prejudice component. If the appellant cannot establish prejudice, there is no need to consider counsel’s performance. As the Supreme Court observed in R. v. G.D.B., 2000 SCC 22, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 520, at para. 29, “[W]here it is apparent that no prejudice has occurred, it will usually be undesirable for appellate courts to consider the performance component of the analysis.”

[15] The prejudice component requires an appellant to demonstrate that the alleged ineffective representation resulted in a miscarriage of justice, either by rendering the trial unfair or by rendering the verdict unreliable: R. v. K.K.M., 2020 ONCA 736, at para. 55. In this appeal, the appellant submits that the verdict is unreliable. To satisfy the unreliable verdict branch, the appellant must establish a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had trial counsel performed in a competent fashion: Fiorilli, at para. 59. A reasonable probability in this context means “more than a mere possibility, but less than a likelihood”: R. v. Joanisse (1995), 102 C.C.C. (3d) 35 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 347, at p. 66. The reasonable probability threshold will be met “when the reviewing court is satisfied that because of counsel’s incompetence, the verdict cannot be taken as a reliable assessment of the appellant’s culpability”: R. v. Al Shammari, 2016 ONCA 614, at para. 75.

[16] The performance component measures counsel’s performance against a reasonableness standard: Joanisse, at p. 41. The appellant must establish that the allegedly incompetent acts or omissions of counsel were not the result of reasonable professional judgment: G.D.B., at para. 27. There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. The assessment of counsel’s performance “is made having regard to the circumstances as they existed when the impugned acts or omissions occurred. Hindsight plays no role in the assessment”: R. v. Archer (2005), 202 C.C.C. (3d) 60, at para. 119.

Counsel’s Cross-Examination of L.V.

[19] ….Second, and more significantly, the appellant says that trial counsel failed to impeach L.V. about six new allegations in her testimony that she did not mention in her….

[26] On its own, this ineffective impeachment could not have impacted the verdict. However, combined with trial counsel’s failure to impeach L.V. on the significant omissions in her police statements, L.V.’s evidence was left largely unchallenged. I turn to those omissions next.

[27] In her police statement, L.V. alleged that the appellant’s abuse of their son, J.V., involved shaking and hitting him, while his abuse of their daughter, R.V., involved shaking her. She did not describe any other assaultive behaviour.

[28] The appellant argues that trial counsel failed to impeach L.V. at all about what he describes as glaring inconsistencies between her testimony and her police statement about the appellant’s alleged abuse of their children. The appellant takes issue with trial counsel’s failure to impeach L.V. on the following six allegations in her testimony, which she had not mentioned in her police statement:

(1) the appellant struck R.V. in addition to shaking her;

(2) R.V. (not just J.V.) was constantly bruised;

(3) the appellant “half suffocate[d]” the children by putting a pillow over them, and sometimes putting his own weight on the pillow, so they would stop crying;

(4) the appellant picked up the children and dropped them in their crib from the height of at least one foot;

(5) when J.V. would have trouble crawling, the appellant would hit J.V. with such force that J.V. went flying across the room; and

(6) the appellant sometimes repeatedly flicked J.V. on the head or the cheek in the same place.

[29] In deciding whether the failure to cross-examine L.V. on these allegations led to a miscarriage of justice, I will consider (1) whether these omissions from her police statement had impeachment value, and (2) whether that impeachment value, when considered against all the evidence, undermined the reliability of the verdict.

[31] The respondent submits that these omissions had limited impeachment value because of the nature of L.V.’s police statement. The respondent argues that the police statement did not purport to be a complete account of the allegations of abuse against the children. Instead, L.V. gave a more detailed account at trial because she was asked more detailed questions there than during her police interview. Relatedly, the police interview moved from topic to topic, making it less likely that L.V. would exhaustively describe all the appellant’s assaultive behaviour. Further, the respondent argues that the omissions had limited impeachment value because there were no dissimilarities between her police statement and her testimony. Rather, in her testimony, L.V. simply provided a more detailed recollection of the abuse than she originally disclosed to the police. Finally, the respondent points out that impeachment on omissions is not without its risks. Had L.V. been impeached on omissions in her police statement, trial counsel would have had to review what she did say in her statement, and the Crown would also have been able to bring out what L.V. had told police.

[32] I agree with the appellant that trial counsel left L.V.’s allegations of child abuse effectively unchallenged. I cannot accept the respondent’s submission that cross-examination on these omissions would have limited impeachment value. These omissions had significant impeachment value. This was not simply a matter, as the respondent puts it, of L.V. providing a more detailed account. The six allegations described above – particularly about suffocating the children and hitting J.V. hard enough that he would “literally go flying across the room” – were the worst allegations of child abuse in L.V.’s testimony. They went beyond shaking both children and also hitting J.V., which were the only allegations of assault that L.V. made in her statement. These were not simply additional details that expanded on what she had already told police. These were new and more serious allegations of child abuse. And these allegations were not peripheral to the charges of assault against the children. Rather, they were the very subject matter of those charges.[Emphasis by PJM]

[33] I also reject the respondent’s submission that these omissions lack impeachment value because L.V.’s statement did not purport to be a complete account of the allegations and because she was not asked detailed questions by police. While I agree that complainants in intimate partner violence and child abuse cases do not always give exhaustive accounts of their allegations, in this case, L.V. was asked specifically if she had anything to add about what took place in Ontario.

[34] In her second police statement, after she had talked about what the appellant had done to the children when they lived in Ontario, the interviewing officer asked L.V., “[S]o did anything else occur when you lived in [Ontario]?” L.V. did not move to another topic. Instead, she related more information about the appellant forcing her to let the children scream in their crib and threatening that if she ever reported him, he would make sure that she was the one who got in trouble. Also, given that L.V. responded to the “anything else” question, this was not a case where the movement of the interview from topic to topic impacted its impeachment value. In short, L.V. was asked directly about anything else occurring in Ontario right after she had discussed the child abuse allegations. Had trial counsel impeached L.V. on these omissions, he could have reasonably argued to the jury that these allegations were things that one would expect she would have mentioned to the interviewing officer.[Emphasis by PJM]

[35] Finally, I reject the respondent’s submission that the risks associated with impeaching L.V. on these omissions diminished their potential impeachment value here. Trial counsel would not have had to read out large portions of L.V.’s police statement. It would have been sufficient for him to have generally summarized L.V.’s allegations that the appellant shook the children – allegations the jury already heard – and to point out that she had been asked if “anything else” occurred. Further, I disagree with the respondent that any impeachment on these omissions would have opened the door to the Crown exploring the police statement in detail to the appellant’s detriment. Any re-examination would have been limited to ensuring that the jury understood the circumstances of the statement and why L.V. omitted the additional allegations. It would not serve as licence for the Crown to explore the entire statement by going through all the details that she did include. Moreover, even if the Crown had been able to recount some of what L.V. told the police, none of those allegations would have been more damaging than what she had told the jury…..

[36] I am satisfied that trial counsel’s ineffective cross-examination of L.V. undermines the reliability of the verdict given trial counsel’s failure to mount any real challenge to L.V.’s evidence.

[40] Moreover, trial counsel’s preparation for the trial left him ill-equipped to conduct any such cross-examination. Trial counsel did not prepare summaries of L.V.’s police statements. He did not take notes of her testimony during the trial. Rather, as she was testifying, he scanned the police statement transcripts for inconsistencies. He did not prepare a cross-examination of L.V., because he felt he would not know what to cross-examine her on until she testified in-chief.

[41] Accordingly, I find that trial counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate crossexamination of L.V. cannot be described as the product of reasonable decisions by counsel.

IV. DISPOSITION

[47] I would allow the appeal, quash the convictions, and order a new trial.